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The Interrelationship between Structure and 
Collective Actors: A Concept for a  
Dynamic-Reciprocal Model of  
Structural Change 
Robert Peters ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Struktur und kollektiven Akteuren: 
Konzept für ein dynamisch-reziprokes Modell strukturellen Wandels«. The pur-
pose of this article is to explain the emergence of a new practice (i.e., reloca-
tion) and the role of entrepreneurial groups in this emergence based on the re-
vealing case of the early-modern needle industry in Germany. In the 18th 
century, Aachen became the leading location for needle production in the en-
tire western world. The city’s industrial rise was intrinsically linked to the emer-
gence of an entrepreneurial group: A small group of needlemakers oligopolized 
the regional needle branch within a few years and created substantial competi-
tive advantages for the production site. In order to analyze the reciprocity of 
structure and agency, I draw on Wolfgang König’s agency-structure concept 
(ASC) and Paul Thomes’ three-phase change model (TCM). I integrate both ap-
proaches into a dynamic-reciprocal model of structural change (DRSC). By do-
ing so, I aim to amplify the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (IE).  
Keywords: Entrepreneurial groups, structural change, agency, innovation, dif-
fusion. 
1.   Introduction 
Traditionally, entrepreneurial activity has been the focus of business history 
and the broad field of social sciences. For a long time, research on “entrepre-
neurs” concentrated on individual actors (Ruef 2010, 8). Particularly since the 
millennium, “research has looked beyond the individual more regularly” and 
scholars now focus on entrepreneurial groups as collective actors (Davidsson 
2016, 20). Examining the interrelationship between established economic and 
societal structures and entrepreneurial groups by referring to the principle of 
the social construction of society is particularly interesting (Giddens 1984). 
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How do entrepreneurial groups behave under the influence of particular struc-
tural circumstances? And what is the role of entrepreneurial groups in the pro-
cess of economic, technological, and societal transformation? 
The purpose of this article is to explain the emergence of a new practice 
(i.e., relocation) and the role of entrepreneurial groups in this emergence based 
on the revealing case of the early-modern needle industry in Germany. In the 
18th century, Aachen became the leading production site for the needle indus-
try in Germany and, for many decades, the city was also the leading location 
for needle production in the entire western world. Aachen’s industrial rise is 
intrinsically tied to the emergence of an entrepreneurial group. Since the mid-
17th century, the needlemaking sector was characterized by a labor division 
between two classes of guild members: One class of master craftsmen (domes-
tic craftsmen) produced needle blanks in their workshops. Another class of 
master craftsmen (merchant producers) finished the product by making it into 
its sellable form and selling the goods. In the late 17th and early 18th century, 
there were presumably 19 merchant producers in Aachen. Guild rules prevent-
ed the merchant producers from relocating parts of the value chain to areas 
beyond Aachen with lower wages. After merchant producers had already made 
a first try at relocating parts of the value chain in the 1660s, an entrepreneurial 
group formed within the class of merchant producers in the 1690s with the goal 
of overcoming guild regulation. Consequentially, the class of merchant produc-
ers started to divide into, first, a smaller group of merchant producers (the 
entrepreneurial group) which aimed to establish a new practice (i.e., relocation) 
and, second, the remaining majority of presumably 14 merchant producers, 
who still operated their business in the manner which had been common prac-
tice for decades. In 1740, the entrepreneurial group finally succeeded in estab-
lishing the new practice after decades of power struggles.  
But what makes these at least five merchant producers an “entrepreneurial 
group”? In terms of definition, I follow Harper, as he defines “entrepreneurial 
teams [as] a group of entrepreneurs with a common goal which can only be 
achieved by appropriate combinations of individual entrepreneurial actions” 
(2008, 617). In terms of notation, I use the connotation “entrepreneurial group” 
instead of Harper’s “entrepreneurial team”, since “team” implies a cohesive 
group and quite close collaboration (cf. Stamm, Discua Cruz, and Cailluet 
2019, 7-35, in this issue). However, the surviving sources give no detailed 
information about the internal relations and the process of collaboration in the 
guild directorate. There are neither sources as transcripts or account books of 
the guild nor ego-documents like letters between the merchant producers (see 
below). Speaking of the investigated entrepreneurial group, I often use the term 
“leading merchant producers” to differentiate them from the remaining 14 
merchants who controlled only a negligible part of the business (Koch 1920, 
81). 
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Based on sources and historiographic literature, it is impossible to define a 
static group for the whole investigation period up to the 1750s. However, there 
is much evidence that there was a group composed of at least Cornelius Chorus 
and Gottfried Strauch (since 1693) together with Peter von Asten, Abraham 
von Sittart (since 1698), and Stephan Giessen (since 1699) (Thissen 1923, 9; 
Koch 1920, 80; Lingens 1921, 105). As Koch ascertains, also contemporary 
actors (local competitors and domestic craftsmen), viewed the group as being a 
collective actor (1920, 81). Each of the five merchant producers operated his 
own business. Simultaneously, they shared the common goal of overcoming 
regulation and, by doing so, of being allowed to relocate parts of the value 
chain to territories with lower wages. As the analysis will bring to light, the key 
to successfully overcoming the regulation was to follow a common strategy 
and to collaborate strategically in the guild directorate, which was both execu-
tive authority and court of first instance for economic law. The five merchant 
producers brought the guild directorate under their control and rotated among 
the senior positions on the board (Thissen 1923, 9). In doing so, they were in 
the position to suspend regulation and to achieve their common goal. It will 
become apparent that no single merchant producer could have overcome regu-
lation on his own.  
By enforcing relocation, the entrepreneurial group developed the well-
known medieval and pre-industrial domestic system into an elaborated produc-
tion network. Thus, they created substantial competitive advantages. The most 
influential entrepreneur, Cornelius Chorus, alone created a company of unprec-
edented size in the needlemaking sector, providing up to 1000 jobs by the 
1730s. A company of comparable size, with approximately 700 workers, did 
not arise in this branch of industry in Continental Europe until 1815 (Aagard 
1987, 226). The decline of guilds is a well know phenomenon in Germany’s 
economic and social history (Reininghaus 2002) and the case of Aachen’s 
needlemaking sector is of particular interest. As will become apparent, the 
decline of traditional guild structures went hand in hand with Aachen’s indus-
trial rise to the leading location for needle production in the entire western 
world. 
Given the fact that the leading merchant producers faced strong resistance 
against their goal to enforce relocation, the questions arise: How were they able 
to succeed? How were they able to successfully overcome regulation? This 
leads on to the research quest that I address on the basis of this case: How does 
an entrepreneurial group change industrial structures through the application 
of innovative business strategies? 
Searching for a methodological approach to analyze the interdependency be-
tween an established structure and collective agency, I discuss the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurship (IE) (chapter 2.3). To overcome the shortcom-
ings of IE, I draw on the three-phase change model (Schumpeter 1939; Lewin 
1947; Thomes and Quadflieg 2012; Schmidt et al. 2016) (chapter 2.2) and the 
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agency-structure concept (Giddens 1984; König 2001, 2009, 2013) (chapter 
2.3) and try to integrate them into a dynamic-reciprocal model of structural 
change (DRSC) (chapter 2.4). Having outlined the methodological approach, I 
apply the DRSC to the given case (chapter 3). I then deduce and discuss the 
major findings and theoretical implications and give a brief outlook on research 
(chapter 4).  
In terms of references, the article is based on relevant sources and compre-
hensive historiographic literature. Council minutes and petitions (1656-1800) 
deliver information about political and legal conflicts, as the city council was 
the autonomous lawmaker, supreme court, and executive authority for econom-
ic law (chapter 3.2). Earlier records have not been preserved because a city fire 
destroyed about 90 percent of Aachen in 1656 (Fromm 1894; Hildebrandt 
1978; Kraus 2007). Moreover, all documents of the needlemaking guild (e.g., 
account books, minutes of guild assemblies) are unrecorded. Historiographic 
literature is characterized by an insufficient evaluation of the given research 
questions. One reason for this is that there has been almost no research on the 
history of needlemaking in Aachen over the last ten decades. Most parts of the 
relevant historiography about the history of Aachen’s needle industry date from 
the early 20th century. Particularly, the history of the needlemaking guild in the 
17th and 18th centuries has attracted only little attention, although the devel-
opment of Aachen’s needlemaking guild was quite unique (Aagard 1987). 
Apparently, that was the reason why many European countries were so keen to 
adopt the Aachen needlemaking approach (Koch 1920, 58 et seq.; Lingens 
1921, 42 et seq.). Thus, I mainly draw on Joseph Koch (1920), Paul Lingens 
(1921), and Otto Anton Thissen (1923). Koch made an outstanding contribu-
tion to research on the history of Aachen’s needlemaking sector, as he explored 
about 150 years of minutes, petitions, and other documents of Aachen’s city 
council from the 1650s to the 1790s. Lingens (1921) gathered and compared 
data on the needlemaking sector in the Rhineland and in Westphalia. Thissen 
(1923) gathered a multitude of information about the biography and the family 
history of Cornelius Chorus. Actually, since World War II, there has been only 
one study on the protoindustrial history of this particular branch of industry, 
that of Herbert Aagard (1987). Aagard examined all needlemaking sites in 
Germany with a focus on the history of technology in the 18th century. Regard-
ing the case of Aachen’s needle business, the historiography focuses on indi-
vidual entrepreneurs, such as Cornelius Chorus, and does not examine the 
particular role of cooperative actors (such as entrepreneurial groups) for the 
development of needlemaking (Hermandung 1908; Vogelgesang 1913; Koch 
1920; Lingens 1921; Thissen 1923; Bruckner 1967: Aagard 1987). 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1  Institutional Entrepreneurship 
Searching for a theoretical approach to explain the interdependency between 
structure and agency means breaking into the field of institutional entrepre-
neurship (IE). At the heart of IE is the institutional entrepreneur. As Garud et 
al. describe:  
To qualify as institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must break with existing 
rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional logic(s) and in-
stitutionalize the alternative rules, practices or logics they are championing. 
(2007, 962)  
As a wide range of literature stresses, the concept of a rulebreaking actor leads 
to the paradox of embedded agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Sewell 1992; 
Holm 1995; Seo and Creed 2002; Garud et al. 2007; Leca et al. 2008; Weik 
2011). Leca et al. describe it as follows:  
If actors are embedded in an institutional field and subject to regulative, nor-
mative and cognitive processes that structure their cognitions, define their in-
terests and produce their identities how are they able to envision new practices 
and then subsequently get others to adopt them? (2008, 961)  
To overcome the paradox, IE understands institutions as being both enablers 
and constrainers of action (ibid., 5). There are two types of enabling and con-
straining conditions: field-level conditions and individual-level conditions. 
Field-level conditions refer to enabling and constraining predispositions (such 
as organizational field characteristics) or acute events (such as a crisis affecting 
interorganizational collaboration) (ibid., 7). First, individual-level enabling 
conditions refer to an actor’s “access to resources needed to engage in institu-
tional entrepreneurship” (ibid., 9). Second, individual-level conditions refer to 
an actor’s specific characteristics, such as the ability “to relate to the situations 
of other actors and, in doing so, to provide them with reasons to cooperate” 
(ibid., 10). Another attempt introduces the concept of “autonomous reflexives” 
(Mutch 2007).  
In terms of competencies that are needed for a person to qualify as an insti-
tutional entrepreneur, Weik says: “With regard to their concrete actions, we 
find that [institutional] entrepreneurs mobilize resources and mobilize other 
actors [. . .]” (2011, 468). Garud et al. emphasize: “[Institutional entrepreneurs] 
mobilize wide ranging coalitions of diverse groups and […] generate the col-
lective action necessary to secure support for and acceptance of institutional 
change” (2007, 962). To build up coalitions they “must be skilled actors who 
can draw on existing cultural and linguistic materials to narrate and theorize 
change in ways that give other social groups reasons to cooperate” (ibid., 962). 
Leca et al. put it in a nutshell and stress two questions as being central to the 
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field of IE: “(1) Under what conditions is an actor likely to become an institu-
tional entrepreneur? (2) How does the process of institutional entrepreneurship 
unfold?” (2008, 6).  
That makes the perspective of IE clear: Its focus is on how some actors, ra-
ther than others, become institutional entrepreneurs. Actually, the literature 
addresses a wide range of requirements for becoming an institutional entrepre-
neur, such as social skills (ibid., 12) and an actor’s social positon in the field 
(Waldron et al. 2014). Leca et al. summarize all these requirements as tangible 
or intangible resources (2008, 15).  
The reductionist perspective on what makes an actor an institutional entre-
preneur may misdirect “attention to heroes and success in a linear timeline [. . 
.] and away from collective efforts, failures and repeated attempts, loops, feed-
backs and interdependencies that the history of institutions is so rich in.” (Weik 
2011, 472). Apparently, Gartner’s charge is still current as he has accused 
research on entrepreneurship of having: 
a tendency to underestimate the influence of external factors and overestimate 
the influence of internal or personal factors when making judgements about 
the behavior of other individuals. (1995, 70) 
It becomes apparent that IE cannot be easily applied to the given case, as it is 
the purpose of this article to examine the emergence of a new practice (i.e. 
relocation) and the role of entrepreneurial groups in this emergence. IE is lack-
ing an equal balance between structure and action. Thus, it is necessary to 
bridge the reductionist perspective on what makes an actor an institutional 
entrepreneur. The focus of this article is neither on their individual skills from 
an intrapersonal perspective nor on their internal group dynamics. Instead, the 
focus is on their strategy for successfully exceeding the scope of the structural 
conditions. An approach is needed that allows the change process to be de-
scribed as a dynamic-reciprocal process of interdependencies between agency 
and structure, including loops, feedback, and interdependencies. 
2.2  Three-Phase Change Model 
To discuss how an entrepreneurial group does change industrial structures 
through the application of innovative business strategies, it is necessary to 
determine what change means. I define change in economic and societal struc-
tures based on the three-phase change model (TCM) (Thomes and Quadflieg 
2013, 39; Schmidt et al. 2016, 45). The TCM defines change as a dynamic 
process, following Lewin’s three-step change model (Lewin 1947). Recent 
articles have stressed the continuing significance of Lewin’s thoughts (Hussain 
et al. 2016; Odor 2018). As Cummings et al. show in their review, Lewin’s 
work has influenced “change management, change theory and practice to this 
day [and its] foundational significance [has] remained unquestioned” (2016, 
33).  
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In terms of theoretical shortcomings, the TCM only describes an exemplary 
change process and cannot explain either interruptions to change or new at-
tempts. Moreover, the TCM is limited to a structural perspective. What is the 
role of agency in the process of change? Rogers’ agency-related periodization 
of innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rog-
ers 2003, 285 et seq.) helps to describe the function of change agents in differ-
ent phases of diffusion. However, he only briefly sketches the role of the estab-
lished structure (Rogers 2003, 26). To explain how the established structure 
enables and prevents paradigm shifts, I draw on the agency-structure concept 
(chapter 2.3). 
2.3  Agency-Structure Concept (ASC) 
Having defined change as an evolutionary and continuing process, I now ex-
plain why I draw on ASC instead of simply applying IE in order to analyze the 
interdependency of agency and structure. Therefore, I discuss both approaches 
in comparison. The starting point for Wolfgang König, when outlining his 
ASC, is Anthony Giddens’ seminal work, The Constitution of Society (König 
2001, 2009, 2013; Giddens 1984). Giddens initialized a fundamental debate on 
how societies are constituted and how they arise and change through individual 
acting. His structuration theory builds upon the duality of structure: “The duali-
ty of structure is always the main grounding of continuities in social reproduc-
tion across time-space” (Giddens 1984, 26). König criticized the structuration 
theory by rejecting Giddens’ institutions concept. Negating the existence of 
structure as such, Giddens defined institutions as intermediaries (e.g., manifest-
ed in the form of legal systems, politics, and economies) between the structure 
and the actor (Giddens 1984, 28 et seq.). König concluded that Giddens’ con-
cept was unsuitable for empirical analysis and for case studies (König 2009, 
97; Schneider 1989, 31 et seq.). This leads to the point where König wanted to 
set his concept apart from Giddens’ theory:  
The actor-groups act within the structures which can be interpreted as ena-
bling and constraining forces to what human beings intend to do and what 
they are doing in reality. (König 2001, 104) 
At first glance, this makes his approach suitable for the purpose of my study, as 
I aim to examine the strategic action of a particular entrepreneurial group. 
König understands history as a possibility space of potential evolution, 
where agency (the particular action of individuals, groups or organizational 
entities) affects the progress of history, following the rationale of historical 
contingency. He chooses a three-level model for analyzing actor behavior, 
including the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Since this approach is not lim-
ited to a particular scale level (Christian 2005, Revel 2010), one can apply this 
to cases with meso-level actors (Table 1). This discrimination may be im-
portant, as I analyze the particular role of entrepreneurial groups (meso-level 
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actors) as distinct from individual entrepreneurs (micro-level actors) in the 
process of structural change. 
Table 1: Actor Levels 
Levels Actors 
Macro 
Elements of Society 
(social classes, occupational categories, consumers, etc.) 
Meso 
Organizational entities 
(corporations, governments, entrepreneurial groups, etc.) 
Micro 
Individuals 
(inventors, entrepreneurs, laborers, politicians, etc.) 
Source: Based on König (2001, 2009, 2013). 
 
Based on the assumption of historical contingency, König drafts choices of 
structural characteristics, leading to possible spaces of activity. Thus, the ASC 
offers useful tools for describing the constraining and enabling effects of an 
established structure on actors’ behavior and for analyzing the repercussion 
effect of entrepreneurial behavior on the newly emerging structure.  
On the one hand, König’s ASC and IE have many things in common. Based on 
Giddens’ duality of structure, König also addresses the paradox of embedded 
agency, albeit implicitly. Thus, ASC and IE, first, share the same starting point: 
the assumption of presupposed context-induced enabling and constraining 
factors affecting agency. Second, similarly to the concept of a rule-breaking 
institutional entrepreneur, the ASC assumes that agents can decide either to act 
within the scope of the possibility space or to exceed it.  
Very often they [agents] act in accordance to the structures which in this way 
are perpetuated. If the actors consider the structures as being too restrictive, 
they could try – and sometimes will be successful – to initiate change in the 
structures. (König 2001, 104) 
On the other hand, König’s ASC varies significantly from the IE. First, there is 
a variation in the terminology. In the field of IE, the term “institutions” is used 
in accordance with the definition of such as “formal and informal rules of the 
game in society” (Schotter 1981, 9; Schotter 1986, 117; Erlei et al. 2007, 22; 
Garud et al. 2007, 958). However, König deviates from this definition. He 
speaks of institutions as organizational entities (König 2013, 510). Following 
this rationale, the ASC concept defines institutions as being meso-level actors, 
such as “business firms” and “associations” (König 2001, 104). König rather 
speaks of “structural conditions” if he refers to the meaning of “institutions” in 
accordance with the definition cited above (König 2001, 2009, 2013). Second, 
ASC and IE have different perspectives on the link between agency and struc-
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ture, as the focus of IE is on how some actors, rather than others, become insti-
tutional entrepreneurs. König’s enabling and constraining conditions build up a 
possibility space affecting all actors in the field, no matter whether they are 
able to leverage their tangible and intangible resources in order to break the 
rules or whether they act within the scope of the possibility space. This is what 
makes the ASC the more suitable approach for my own analysis.  
As my focus is neither on their individual skills from an intrapersonal per-
spective nor on their internal group dynamics, I do not examine the process of 
formation of the investigated entrepreneurial group. Instead, my focus is on 
their strategy for successfully exceeding the scope of the structural conditions. I 
examine their (external) interaction with the established structure and other 
actors (such as other local merchants and domestic craftsmen). The latter are 
also affected by structural conditions without being institutional entrepreneurs 
in the sense of groundbreaking change agents. The ASC, whose focus is not 
limited to the successful actors, may be the suitable approach to bridge the 
shortcomings of IE.  
In terms of limitations, the ASC, as a static model, fails to consider that the 
constitutive effect of activity is an evolutionary process. Following the ra-
tionale of Rogers’ diffusion theory (2003), I assume that the enabling and con-
straining forces diminish – step by step. Thus, the ASC alone does not allow an 
analysis of the role of actors in a dynamic step-by-step change process. Possi-
bly, an integration of ASC and TCM may solve the shortcomings of both the 
ASC and the TCM. 
2.4   Dynamic Reciprocal Model of Structural Change 
Before introducing an integrated approach of TCM and ASC, I return to the 
limitations of both concepts in order to discuss the potential value of a DRSC. 
The TCM only describes an exemplary change process and cannot explain 
either interruptions or new attempts. I argue that these phenomena are results of 
the interplay of the established structure and agency, which is the domain of the 
ASC. If innovative actors try to enforce a new paradigm but the constraining 
forces of the established structure are too strong, this can lead to failures and 
new attempts (Weik 2011, 472). The TCM, vice versa, may solve the short-
comings of the ASC. I assume that the constraining forces of the established 
structure diminish in the course of the advancing change process, and König’s 
approach lacks an explanation for this phenomenon. However, that is where the 
TCM allows us to understand the dynamic phase as an overlap of established 
and newly emerging structures.  
The starting point of a dynamic reciprocal process of structural change is the 
established structure. I use factors from the social, technological, economic, 
political, legal, and environmental (STEPLE) analysis (Aguilar 1967, 11; An-
drews 1980, 55, 69; Lynch 2003, 93 et seq.) to shape the possibility space. 
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maneuvering? What is this actor’s specific role within the change process? To 
what extent is the actor’s behavior responsible for structural change?  
3.1  Period of Investigation 
When I talk of the idea of “relocation” of needle blank production as the 
examined new practice, the first evidence of relocation dates from 1661. At this 
time, the merchants’ attempt to relocate was effectively suppressed by the guild 
(chapter 3.2). The established structure still controlled the merchants’ efforts. 
In the terminology of the given model, the invention of the relocation of needle 
blank production can be proven for the year 1661. Obviously, an earlier 
invention cannot be ruled out, but strong evidence shows that this was the first 
substantial case of relocation: Since 1656, all council minutes have been 
preserved. In the following decades, there are only scattered indications of 
efforts to undermine guild law (Koch 1920, 75). The next substantial relocation 
attempt can be proven for 1693, when needle merchants received permission 
from the guild to relocate production stages to locations outside Aachen (Koch 
1920, 75). Henceforth, the dispute about relocation became the dominant issue 
within the needlemaker guild. Up to this point, the date of the initiation of the 
unfreezing phase can be determined as 1693. Consequentially, I focus on the 
time period from 1693 onwards. The end of my investigation period is the mid-
18th century. By 1740, the entrepreneurial group had successfully overcome 
regulation and stabilized the relocation practice as the new paradigm (chapter 
3.4). 
3.2 Established Structure in the 17th Century and the Early 18th 
Century 
In this chapter, I analyze the structure of the needlemaking sector for the 
second half of the 17th century. This structure defines the initial situation and 
the established structure (see Figure 3). Therefore, I describe the particular 
structural conditions to extrapolate the specific possibility space for merchant 
producers. 
Technological conditions: The manufacturing process was regulated by 
guild rules from 1615 onwards. This legal framework set a strict mandate for 
residents of Aachen and its peripheral territory who wanted to produce needles. 
Master craftsmen were obligated to use only fine and pure steel to produce 
needles and were forbidden to use iron (Guild Rules 1615). Thus, guild rules 
provide important evidence of the specific manufacturing technique that 
Aachen’s needlemaking sector used. The only way to make steel wire into 
pointed needles was to smash through it by using a steel chisel with a flattened 
tip (von Pöllnitz 1737, 862; Koch 1920, 24, 44). By committing all 
needlemakers to using steel wire only (and no iron wire), Aachen had a 
substantial technological advantage in the 17th century. With a carbon content 
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packed in moist canvas strips in several layers. Then, a mixture of scouring 
powder is applied before the canvas is tied. Several scouring bolts are placed 
between two wooden panels on a scouring table (Aagard 1987, 156). Before 
water-powered scouring benches were adopted, first traceable in Aachen in 
1633, the scouring tables had been hand-operated (Aagard 1987, 160 et seq.). 
Eventually, the exploitation of water power led to significant efficiency gains. 
Before water-operated scouring tables were used, the maximum filling quantity 
of each scouring bolt was 15,000 needles. Hand-operated scouring tables could 
process only two bolts at once and the procedure took about two days (ibid.). 
Due to the water-operated system, a producer could process scouring bolts 
of about 90,000 needles apiece (ibid., 159, 172). Previous sources mention 
different figures. Koch quantifies the number at 30,000 to 35,000 needles per 
scouring bolt and 12 to 20 bolts per scouring table. However, water power 
undoubtedly enabled more efficient and more effective production. Thus, the 
capacity can be estimated as 360,000 to 700,000 needles per scouring table. 
Even the water-operated scouring process took about two days (Koch 1920, 45-
48). Following the data, we can determine an approximate significant capacity 
increase through the adoption of water-operated scouring tables of 1,000 to 
more than 2,300 percent. 
The efficiency effect was extraordinary. Obviously, water-operated scouring 
mills offered significant economies for anybody who might own such facilities. 
At the same time, scouring mills with the mentioned capacity were not feasible 
for an individual domestic craftsman because no one artisan could ever supply 
300,000 to 700,000 needle blanks in two days. Therefore, several master 
craftsmen concentrated on this production stage and focused the output of 
many needlemakers on scouring the needle blanks in their scouring mills (ibid., 
48). This tremendous efficiency effect resulted in a comprehensive application 
of this mass-production technique during the mid-17th century. Further, this 
technique provided the division of labor between the domestic craftsmen and 
the merchant producers (Bruckner 1967, 142). 
Political-legal conditions: Since 1166, Aachen had held a unique political 
position. At that time, Emperor Frederick I (Barbarossa) conferred a special 
status on Aachen. Since then, Aachen had been a Free Imperial City and thus, 
had extensive rights of autonomy until the French occupied the city in 1794. 
Moreover, the special status led to an exemption from duty for trade within the 
Holy Roman Empire. King Charles the Wise (1338-1380) granted an 
exemption from trade duty to all merchants who exported from Aachen to 
French territory. This special relationship with France lasted until the 16th 
century. These advantages led to an early continental interweaving between 
Aachen and the most important trade centers (ibid., 51 et seq.). Moreover, 
Aachen was surrounded by several foreign territories with different economic 
and political regimes due to the typical German scattered regionalism during 
the early modern age. I argue that, for that reason, it is justified for this article 
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to talk of “foreign” territories and to distinguish between a domestic and a non-
domestic workforce. 
Based on these conditions, the needlemaker guild in Aachen officially arose 
in the early 17th century. However, as Alex Hermandung’s findings on the 
guild history of Aachen imply, the needlemaker guild had been in existence 
earlier, as the city council had enacted the guild rules in 1615 (Hermandung 
1908, 18). For this article, I concentrate on the codified legal framework that 
the city council enacted in 1615. Henceforth, guild rules created the legal 
framework for the needlemaking sector. Anybody who wanted to produce 
needles in the city of Aachen or its surrounding territory had to comply with 
these regulations. Thus, every man who wanted to make needles in his own 
workshop had to join the guild. 
In terms of the legal system, the city council was the autonomous lawmaker, 
supreme court, and executive authority for economic law. Guild rules were 
mandatory standards, valid within Aachen’s territory, although neither the 
guild leaders nor the city council had any executive agency to enforce the law. 
Moreover, the enforcement of the guild rules was highly dependent on the 
guild directorate because that was the inspectorate body for the needle sector as 
well as the executive authority and the court of first instance for economic law 
(ibid., 59, 63 et seq.). 
Beginning in 1615, guild rules stipulated the requirements for becoming a 
master craftsman. First, the guild established a training system in which an 
apprenticeship took three years to complete and every apprentice had to 
register for the guild. Moreover, the apprenticing master craftsman had to pay a 
registration fee for the apprentice. After three years, the young needlemaker 
could be examined through his manufacture of a “masterpiece.” In addition to 
the examination, he had to pay a fee to the guild for his final registration. Then, 
the needlemaker was a fully entitled master craftsman and a member of the 
guild. Every master craftsman had active and passive electoral rights for the 
election of the guild directorate which took place every year on April 30 (Guild 
Rules 1615; Koch 1920, 33 et seq.). 
Guild rules also limited the maximum size of a workshop. Each master 
craftsman was allowed to employ up to four apprentices and only one 
apprenticed servant. Koch points out that guild law followed the principle of 
equality between all master craftsmen.
 
Concerning the organizational structure 
of production, Koch’s findings reveal that master craftsmen accomplished all 
the working steps as an integrated production process in their workshops 
(Guild Rules 1615; Koch 1920, 33 et seq.). To sum up, the central legal 
framework created a traditional system of shop fabrication. Significant growth 
of the workshops or labor division was not intended, neither inside nor outside 
Aachen (Hermandung 1908, 67 et seq.). In the first decades, the guild 
directorate was anxious to sustain the regime by concretizing the legal 
framework. As early as 1631, the guild rules were supplemented to segregate 
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domestic from non-domestic products through the codification of former 
customary law. Foreign needlemakers from areas outside the territory of 
Aachen should not be allowed to sell needles by using the designation 
“Aachen” for their trademarks (Guild Rules, first amendment 1631). Likewise, 
the needlemaker guild intervened emphatically in 1661, when merchants from 
Aachen hired non-domestic workers to manufacture needle blanks. The 
domestic craftsmen objected successfully to this new procedure (Council 
Minutes June 5, 1661). Koch attests that this verdict made an impact upon the 
business routine for needlemaking in the next few decades (Koch 1920, 39). 
Economic conditions and geographic circumstances: The empirical material 
yields relevant factors: water resources, infrastructure, factor costs, and 
oversupply of experienced workers. 
First, water resources are an important factor. Rich water resources had been 
the fundament of the settlement of brass producers in Aachen in the 15th 
century and Aachen’s rise to the leading location for brass production in 
Europe. Since the 17th century, the needlemaking branch also used this 
technology (Bruckner 1967, 142). After the comprehensive application of 
scouring mills caused labor division, there is a second relevant factor to add. 
No master craftsman could produce large amounts of needles in his workshop 
with a limited number of workers and (simultaneously) place his products in 
continental markets. Long-distance trade meant traveling hundreds of miles by 
coach in the 17th century. This factor also caused the division of labor in the 
needlemaking sector. A domestic system became established, and the merchant 
producers arose as a second category of master craftsmen. Although labor 
division was not intended by the guild, there is no indication of any resistance 
during the 1630s. Instead, domestic craftsmen seemed to take up the challenge 
of the fight for equality within the specialized system (regarding the various 
guild conflicts, especially towards the end of the 17th century, see chapter 3.4). 
Nevertheless, the merchant producers gained the upper hand after that. They 
were in the stronger market position because they supplied the wire, tempered 
the needles, and owned the scouring mills, thus controlling the most important 
production stages which were critical for the quality of the manufacture (Koch 
1920, 39). 
The second factor is the infrastructural conditions. Due to Aachen’s political 
and religious prominence for many centuries, the city became well connected 
to interregional and continental trade routes early on. Moreover, Aachen was 
accessible by road from many regions. This location supported the 
development of all businesses in Aachen through comfortable access to factor 
and sales markets (Ibid., 14 et seq.).  
Third, the factor costs are important for analyzing the economic conditions, 
especially in comparison to other territories beyond Aachen. On the one hand, 
the urban population had relatively high living costs and often no other income 
except the inhabitants’ regular occupation. On the other hand, the rural 
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population could produce needles or other products as a secondary occupation 
in addition to farming. Additional nonwage labor costs within Aachen resulted 
from the guild fees and from special fees for selected production stages (Koch 
1920, 66, 77). 
Fourth, the oversupply of experienced wire workers since the late 16th 
century was an important economic factor. After Aachen had become the 
leading location for brass production in Europe, an exodus from Aachen to 
Stolberg (Rhineland) began during the mid-16th century (Römling 2007, 145 et 
seq.; Bruckner 1967, 147). Therefore, Aachen had lost its position as the 
European market leader by the second half of the 18th century. Previous 
researchers assumed that the Counter-Reformation caused this rapid economic 
downfall of Aachen’s brass sector. Some authors claim that the predominantly 
Protestant brass masters were forced to migrate from Aachen to Stolberg 
because of their religious denomination. However, recent research proves that 
the exodus of Aachen’s brass sector was due to economic reasons (Thomes and 
Quadflieg 2012; Peters 2017). As a result of this development, many laborers 
from the brass sector became underemployed, and the needle sector benefitted 
from the large number of workers who were experienced in metal working 
(Vogelgesang 1913, 27). 
As the last category, I analyze the particular societal conditions. Aachen was 
characterized economically by guild structures and sectorially by textile and 
brass manufacture. Each guild funded a unified system of apprenticeship. Thus, 
the guilds wanted to ensure labor quality. Skills and knowledge had been 
handed down from generation to generation through this long tradition of 
imparting expertise. First, this affected the needlemaking sector through the 
enduring oversupply of experienced wire workers. Second, the system of 
apprenticeship created highly qualified craftsmen. 
3.3   Derived Possibility Space 
Based on the previous structure analysis for the late 17th century, I now turn to 
describe the possibility space for merchant producers in general. Table 2 
classifies the structural conditions into enabling and constraining factors.  
In terms of technological conditions, through the established structure mer-
chant producers benefitted from substantial technology advantages compared to 
the producers’ continental competitors. Thus, these merchant producers pro-
duced higher-quality needles and benefitted from their dominant market posi-
tion as owners and leaseholders of the scouring mills. 
In terms of political-legal conditions, the merchant producers’ entrepreneurial 
behavior was constrained by strict regulation. Thus, significant growth of 
workshops and cross-border expansion to relocate needle blank production 
were illegal. However, the merchant producers were protected against competi-
tors from other areas outside the territory of Aachen, who were not allowed to 
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use trademarks bearing the designation “Aachen.” Moreover, the political-legal 
system had no agency to execute the law in order to enforce regulation against 
domestic entrepreneurs. This lack of agency might have been a potential gate-
way to undermining the regulation. 
Table 2: Enabling and Constraining Factors for Actor Behavior 
Structural 
conditions 
Enabling factors Restricting factors 
Technological 
conditions 
− application of predominant 
technology (steel wire) 
− application of water-   
− powered scouring tables   
− with resulting efficiency gain 
for merchant producers 
 
Political-legal 
conditions 
− no/weak executive agency 
− participation through active 
and passive electoral rights 
− strict regulation (growth of 
workshops, job relocation, market 
access) 
Economic 
conditions 
− available water resources 
− dominant market position 
− immediate access to continen-
tal trade routes 
− oversupply of experienced 
laborers 
− high labor costs (high living costs 
compared to rural areas, nonwage 
costs) 
Societal condi-
tions 
− traditionally prevalent and 
institutionally secured 
knowledge and skills 
 
 
In terms of economic conditions, the merchant producers’ initial position was 
good. Unhindered access to resources and continental trade routes, Aachen’s 
status as an Imperial City, and an oversupply of experienced laborers were 
important. The only disadvantage was the relatively high labor costs. Last, in 
terms of societal conditions, the merchant producers benefitted from an estab-
lished training system that produced a highly qualified and skilled workforce. 
3.4   Actor Analysis  
Based on the taxonomy of the DRSC, this chapter analyzes the entrepreneurial 
behavior of merchant producers as a collective meso-level actor. To call the 
guiding question to mind: How does an entrepreneurial group change industrial 
structures through the application of innovative business strategies? 
The first recorded evidence for joint entrepreneurial action dates from 1693. 
A group of merchant producers secured a guild decision to allow the placing of 
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orders for needle blanks with non-domestic workers (the relevant production 
stages involve the complete manufacturing of needle blanks). This decision 
was presumably provoked by the mentioned entrepreneurial group in order to 
take advantage of wage differentials between the guild-organized domestic 
craftsmen in Aachen and the rural population of the surrounding territories 
(Council Minutes September 26, 1696, October 15, 1696). Wage differentials 
resulted first from the lower cost of living in rural regions and second from 
guild fees that the craftsmen had to pay in Aachen (chapter 3.2). In this respect, 
the entrepreneurial group’s track can be interpreted as an attempt to subvert the 
legislation of a highly regulated labor market in Aachen. 
As Koch noted, the city council revoked their previous decision and inter-
dicted the placing of orders with non-domestic workers due to the objections of 
the domestic craftsmen (1920, 76). Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial group did 
not observe the prohibition, thus, many domestic craftsmen became underem-
ployed (Council Minutes January 3, 1696). Consequently, they opposed and 
assaulted the merchants and seized the wire and needle blanks produced 
abroad. In response to this riot, the city council commissioned a delegation to 
investigate and to order the situation in the needlemaking sector. The results 
could not have satisfied the domestic craftsmen at all because the city council 
de facto allowed the merchants to do as they liked (Council Minutes December 
22, 1695), thus, further riots occurred. In response to this continuing conflict, 
the council modified its regulations yet again. Primarily, it prohibited the plac-
ing of orders with non-domestic workers. Moreover, the council forbade pay-
ment with goods instead of money (Council Minutes January 3, 1696). Later, 
the council allowed merchants to relocate if the domestic craftsmen could not 
provide a sufficient supply, but only for the thickest needle numbers. The di-
ameter of the needles was declared in numbers: one, the thickest, to ten and 
later up to twenty, the slimmest. Council Minutes from 1699 and 1700 indicate 
that relocation became common practice because the entrepreneurial group 
ignored the council’s decision (Council Minutes October 16, 1699; Council 
Petition April 22, 1700). Developments up until 1696 show that the entrepre-
neurial group gathered around Cornelius Chorus can be identified as an innova-
tor concerning the relocation approach. As the first result, an appreciable 
change occurred in the given structure. The merchant producers exploited the 
possibility space through rigid non-compliance with the ban on a non-domestic 
workforce. The legal system was not able to prevent the merchants from ignor-
ing legislation. As I brought to light in chapter 3.2, the established structure had 
no executive agency to enforce guild law. The merchant producers ably ex-
ploited the Achilles’ heel of the guild-regulated structure. Ultimately, the city 
council amended the guild law and allowed relocation of parts of the produc-
tion program.  
The unrelenting strategy of the entrepreneurial group was economically 
crowned with success. Obviously, a fundamental gap had arisen by 1708 be-
HSR 44 (2019) 4   │  116 
tween the group and the majority of 14 smaller merchant producers. Cornelius 
Chorus alone employed about 50 laborers in his facility in 1700. In addition, 50 
to 60 domestic craftsmen worked for him, either decentralized in their work-
shops or as homeworkers in Aachen, as a petition by domestic craftsmen 
claimed. There is no reliable information about the number of workers for each 
of the leading merchants. Certainly, the data for Stephan Giessen offer an indi-
cation of the approximate size of the other merchant producers’ enterprises. 
Giessen employed 33 servants and apprentices in his facility and controlled 15 
domestic craftsmen in 1699. Data on the enterprise size of the other leading 
merchants are missing. By comparison, the 14 smaller merchants controlled 
only eleven domestic craftsmen in total (Koch 1920, 81). The domestic crafts-
men controlled by the entrepreneurial group, however, were still fully regis-
tered master craftsman and members of the guild. Nonetheless, they were eco-
nomically dependent on the leading merchant producers. The entrepreneurial 
group granted the craftsmen advances on their work and paid them with goods 
rather than with money (Koch 1920, 82 et seq.; Bruckner 1967, 186). Thus, the 
domestic craftsmen were wageworkers rather than independent craftsmen in 
terms of the medieval and protoindustrial domestic system (Kocka 2016, 25 et 
seq., 35 et seq., 44 et seq.). 
The entrepreneurial group exploited their financial resources to overcome 
regulation in the long run. Since the turn of the century, the entrepreneurial 
group collaborated to control the guild directorate and rotated among the lead-
ing positions on the board. Chorus and his allies put their dependent employees 
under pressure to control their voting activities by offering them credits on fees 
or advance pay (Koch 1920, 82; Council Petition, October 9, 1709). Thus, they 
controlled the executive authority and the court of first instance for economic 
law (chapter 3.2) and were in the position to suspend any regulation. Domestic 
craftsmen claimed that the ban on a non-domestic workforce had not been 
enforced since the turn of the century. Moreover, domestic craftsman claimed 
that Cornelius Chorus bribed guild members to vote for him to become a mem-
ber of the guild directorate (Koch 1920, 82 et seq.; Council Petition March 15, 
1709).  
In the 1690s, the group successfully adopted the innovative approach of re-
location. In this phase, the merchant producers were still affected by regulation. 
However, they successfully exceeded the possibility space. As a result, the 
established structure of guild regulation started to unfreeze. Over time, the 
change process advanced under the impact of this group. In the first decade of 
the 18th century, the relocation of needle blanks manufacturing became an 
increasingly common practice in the needlemaking sector. After approximately 
1700, the innovative idea of relocation diffused and started to replace the estab-
lished division of labor between merchants and domestic craftsmen, as had 
been common practice since the 1630s. During this highly dynamic phase, the 
entrepreneurial group was a key player in the dynamic change process. Togeth-
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er, the leading merchants leveraged the legal system; but how could they suc-
ceed in exploiting the possibility space?  
It becomes apparent that there were two critical success factors: First, nei-
ther the guild nor the city council had the means to preserve the established 
guild structure. Thus, the weakness of the legal system served the entrepreneur-
ial group as a gateway to initiate a new practice. In doing so, the group initiated 
a momentum by enforcing the relocation practice because the leading merchant 
producers’ strategy was economically crowned with success. They achieved a 
dominant economic position and their businesses increased. In contrast, their 
14 opponents apparently decided to act within the scope of the possibility space 
and complied with established guild rules. Consequently, only the entrepre-
neurial group could mobilize considerable financial resources. The second 
critical success factor was that the entrepreneurial group decided to collaborate 
in the guild directorate to suspend regulation in the long run. No single mer-
chant producer could have overcome regulation by himself. Only as a coopera-
tive (meso-level) actor could the merchant producers successfully control the 
whole guild directorate by controlling the majority of domestic craftsmen 
through credits, advances, and vote buying. 
With these findings in mind, the reaction of the city council is important. 
The city council overruled the decision to regulate the needlemaking sector 
top-down. As though the city council were aware of its weak position, it started 
a new approach to address the conflict between the entrepreneurial group and 
the other guild members. In 1709, the council tried to reach an agreement be-
tween these groups to settle several differences, such as the maximum number 
of workers each merchant producer was allowed to employ in his facility. 
However, the conflict over the relocation of needle blank production remained 
unresolved (Koch 1920, 81). As mentioned in chapter 3.2, as of 1615, the guild 
rules limited the number of workers that each master craftsman was allowed to 
employ in his facility to a cap of four apprentices and only one apprenticed 
servant. The leading merchant producers ignored this limit for a decade. For 
example, Chorus and Giessen each employed more than 30 persons in their 
facilities. Chorus alone built up an enterprise with approximately 100 to 120 
workers in Aachen in the early 18th century. Following a report from 1710, he 
presumably employed two to three times as many non-domestic workers as in 
Aachen. Altogether, his business counted 200 to 360 workers (Bruckner 1967, 
186 et seq.; Koch 1920, 83). 
The first draft of the suggested agreement from 1709 intended to increase 
the number of workers to 35 heads per guild member (Council Minutes March 
7, 1709). This number is interesting because both Chorus and Giessen had not 
complied with this limit for about ten years. Therefore, Chorus did not agree to 
the first draft of the contract. After further negotiations, the parties agreed on a 
limit of 35 servants, not 35 heads, per guild member (Council Petition June 13, 
1709). This agreement meant that the number of apprenticed servants was 
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limited but the number of apprentices per guild member was no longer limited 
(Koch 1920, 81). 
These events confirm the impression of a powerless legal system. A signifi-
cant structural change occurred repeatedly. The entrepreneurial group subvert-
ed the legal framework and, again, former injustice became justice. 
After renewed complaints by the domestic craftsmen induced by the still 
missing prevention of the relocation practice in 1711, the city council substan-
tiated its regulations of 1696. The council declared that placing orders with 
non-domestic workers had been allowed only for needle numbers one and two. 
Merchant producers were to prioritize domestic craftsmen in the awarding of 
contracts for numbers one and two in economically difficult times (Council 
Minutes 8 January, 1711). Subsequently, the entrepreneurial group did not 
follow this edict, as was customary in Aachen. Furthermore, they extended the 
common practice of relocation. Sources prove that orders were placed with 
non-domestic workers up to needle number 15 for the year 1715 (Council Peti-
tion November 8, 1715). As a consequence, the business of the domestic 
craftsmen dwindled while production outside Aachen increased (Koch 1920, 
83). Many apprenticed servants took advantage of this development. They 
migrated to areas beyond the territory of Aachen (Council Minutes 6 August, 
1715). As Koch states, this was the coherent reaction because they did not have 
to pay guild fees there. Moreover, they might have been certain that they would 
get enough work from the merchants in their new home (Koch 1920, 83 et 
seq.). In this desperate situation, the council threatened the merchant producers 
with draconic penalties: if the merchants paid with goods rather than with mon-
ey, the merchant producers would lose their citizenship (Council Minutes 15 
November, 1715). That shows again the executive deficit of the legal system. 
Koch highlights that the leading merchant producers were aware that the coun-
cil would never enforce such draconian penalties. Whenever the council inflict-
ed a punishment, it repeatedly reversed the judgment afterwards (Koch 1920, 
84). 
In the face of escalation, the word “silence” best captures the essence of the 
relationship between the entrepreneurial group and domestic craftsmen in the 
1720s. The class of merchant producers became enmeshed in extensive con-
flicts about their trademarks and guild elections. Each party had to satisfy his 
domestic craftsmen to prevent them from defecting to the opposing side. That 
was also true for the entrepreneurial group. After decades of exploitation and 
poverty, the domestic craftsmen enjoyed years of reprieve (Koch 1920, 95, 85-
94). However, this hiatus from poverty and exploitation ended in 1730. After 
the merchant producers had settled their differences with the help of the city 
council, Chorus led the guild again and the entrepreneurial group could contin-
ue suspending regulation (Ibid., 95 et seq.). The result was the next act of a 
decades-long fight for primacy and assets in the needlemaking sector. 
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For decades, the domestic craftsmen never achieved a united line of action 
against suppression by the leading merchant producers. However, 75 craftsmen 
signed a petition in 1739 in which they criticized the well-known problems, 
especially underemployment and the common practice of relocation. In con-
trast, the entrepreneurial group complained about the increased competition 
from other production sites. Once again, the council tried to mediate, and nego-
tiators from each party came together to find a way out. Cornelius Chorus 
assumed the function of negotiator for the leading merchant producers. Finally, 
the parties concluded a contract in August 1739, according to which the entre-
preneurial group accepted a stop to relocation as long as the domestic crafts-
men could provide a sufficient – and suitable – supply of needle blanks (Koch 
1920, 95-8). After it became apparent that the group was not observing the 
agreement, the mayor of Aachen intervened and ordered the town-gate officials 
to confiscate exported wire and imported needles (Council Minutes September 
11, 1739). The regulation became effective for the first time since 1693, lead-
ing to domestic craftsmen recovering slowly but surely. Their dependence on 
the leading merchant producers decreased, allowing them to exercise their 
political rights and, therefore, win the guild election (Koch 1920, 95-98).  
The events of 1739 bring up an important question. As repeatedly men-
tioned, the former established structure that evolved in the 17th century had 
substantial deficits in the enforcement of any regulations. The investigated 
entrepreneurial group could launch new business practices and, due to their 
collaborative strategy to control the guild directorate, they were given carte 
blanche. How were the domestic craftsmen able to prevail again and, regarding 
relocation, to turn back the hands of time? Two factors seem to be critical. 
First, the domestic craftsmen were united for the first time. Before 1739, the 
entrepreneurial group knew how to drive a wedge between the different groups 
of domestic craftsmen. One can argue that the domestic craftsmen somehow 
learned from the entrepreneurial group that collective agency is a promising 
strategy. This new unity was a unique situation since the 1660s. Second, Cho-
rus and his allies perhaps assumed that their approved method of ignoring 
regulations would work again and, once more, they accepted the regulations. 
For the umpteenth time, they proceeded to ignore them but, for the first time, 
this practice did not work. There is every indication that the entrepreneurial 
group had not planned on such magnitude of unity among the domestic crafts-
men.  
It becomes apparent that structural change did not inevitably mean that the 
formerly established structure had made way for an entirely different one. 
Certainly, the established structure lost ground during the change process and 
the leading merchant producers stabilized the new practice. However, both the 
newly emerging structure and the established structure overlap. Thus, it is 
possible for other actors (the domestic craftsmen in this particular case) to turn 
back the hands of time in the right circumstances.  
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Nevertheless, there was more to come. Aachen’s needlemaking sector 
looked back on decades of distinct economic relations with foreign territories, 
especially the Abbey of Burtscheid and the Duchy of Jülich, among others. 
Thus, this sudden compartmentalization led to serious effects on non-domestic 
workers. In the territory of Jülich alone, about 4,000 to 5,000 needlemakers 
were affected by unemployment (von Kempen 1913, 76 et seq.). This number 
suggests the sheer magnitude that the relocation practice had achieved by the 
1730s. Subsequently, the Administration of the Electoral Palatinate in Düssel-
dorf protested against the lockout. In reaction to the city council’s decision, the 
Electoral Palatinate prevented cereal deliveries to Aachen. The Imperial City of 
Aachen was dependent on trade routes that crossed the territory of the Electoral 
Palatinate. Therefore, the sanctions threatened the means of existence for Aa-
chen. Therefore, the city council repealed its decision (Aagard 1987, 272; von 
Kempen 1913, 76; Koch 1920, 98). Subsequently, leading merchant producers 
and domestic craftsmen concluded an agreement in 1740 in which the mer-
chants committed themselves to prioritizing domestic craftsmen on the condi-
tion that they supplied goods of quality. Unfortunately, the contract gave the 
merchant producers authority to assess such quality. Consequently, by 1740, 
the entrepreneurial group had recovered their hegemony (Koch 1920, 98). They 
successfully stabilized the new paradigm and the new structure refroze.  
As it already became apparent during the unfreezing and dynamic phases, 
the entrepreneurial group initiated a momentum of change. The conflict be-
tween the Imperial City and the Electoral Palatinate reveals that the momentum 
led to another relevant effect: one could argue that only the successfully intro-
duced relocation practice and its extensive effect on the economic development 
of foreign territories led to the Duke of Jülich’s intervention. 
3.5  A Collective Agency as Driver for Structural Change 
In the last step, I integrate the findings of structure analysis and actor analysis 
into a compromised perspective. With the above mentioned decision of 1740, 
decades of power struggles ended.  
Figure 5
Source: Au
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period. To recapitulate, “structural conditions” describe the particular circum-
stances under which merchant producers operate their business. 
In terms of political-legal conditions, strict regulation turned into the de fac-
to liberalization of the labor market and workshop growth. Moreover, the in-
creasing support from foreign authorities against regulatory policy extenuated 
the enforcement of the relocation practice against resistance by the established 
structure.  
Table 3: Enabling and Constraining Factors after 1740 
Structural 
conditions 
Enabling factors Constraining factors 
Technological 
conditions 
− application of predominant technology 
(steel wire) 
− application of water-powered scouring 
tables with resulting efficiency gain for 
merchant producers 
 
Political-legal 
conditions 
− no/weak executive agency  
− participation through active and passive 
electoral rights 
− de facto political hegemony 
− de facto repealed regulation (growth of 
workshops, job relocation, market ac-
cess) 
−  support from foreign authorities 
against regulatory policy 
− strict regulation (growth 
of workshops, job relo-
cation, market access) 
Economic 
conditions 
− available water resources  
− dominant market position 
− immediate access to continental trade 
routes 
− oversupply of experienced laborers  
− access to low-wage labor markets 
outside Aachen 
− high labor costs (high 
living costs comparing 
to rural areas, nonwage 
costs) 
Societal 
conditions 
− traditionally prevalent and institutional-
ly secured knowledge and skills 
− social division between formerly equal 
master craftsmen into (1) a group of 
well-funded largescale manufacturers 
and (2) a group of dependent wage-
workers 
 
 
In terms of economic conditions, the change process opened up access to low-
wage labor markets. This liberalization led to a significant reduction in labor 
costs for the merchant producers. Furthermore, the competition with non-
domestic needlemakers intensified the pressure on domestic craftsmen to work 
for less money. 
In terms of societal conditions, the former de jure and – presumably – nearly 
de facto equal relationship between the merchant producers and the domestic 
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craftsmen was replaced by de facto fundamental social division. The resulting 
existence-threatening poverty of the domestic craftsmen was devastating for 
social cohesion in the needlemaking business. 
4. Conclusion 
To summarize the major findings of this paper and to discuss its methodologi-
cal implications, I return to the purpose of this article, which was to explain the 
emergence of a new practice (i.e., relocation) and the role of entrepreneurial 
groups therein, based on the preindustrial case of the German needle industry. I 
discussed the concept of IE and, to overcome its shortcomings, I integrated 
TCM and SAC. In doing so, I aimed to find a method that may allow the recip-
rocal interdependency between entrepreneurial groups as collective actors and 
the established and emerging structures to be described. The guiding research 
question was: How does an entrepreneurial group change industrial structures 
through the application of innovative business strategies? 
I have shown how smartly the investigated group of merchant producers 
used their advantage over the domestic craftsmen to leverage the weaknesses of 
the established structure and to enforce their own interests. The introduced 
structural factors help to describe the effect of structural conditions on the 
space for entrepreneurial maneuvers holistically and differentiatedly. The actor 
analysis revealed that the collaboration of the investigated entrepreneurial 
group was by no means methodless or intuitive. They decided to exceed the 
possibility space. In contrast, the remaining merchants decided to act within the 
scope of the established structure. The group precisely aimed for the Achilles’ 
heel of the established guild-regulated structure and initiated a change process 
in which the established structure became replaced by the emerging structure in 
an incremental process. Therefore, I have shown that there is an overlap of the 
established and the emerging structures. Accordingly, the established structure 
diminished phase by phase. 
However, the investigated entrepreneurial group was a key player in the 
successful diffusion of the relocation practice. The group collaborated in the 
guild directorate to suspend regulation. But neither innovative agency nor the 
weaknesses of the established structure were solely responsible for the deline-
ated change. The group rather initiated a momentum by introducing the reloca-
tion of blank production as a new practice. Consequentially, they first benefit-
ted from the resulting financial resources, which they needed in order to control 
the domestic craftsmen, to suspend regulation, and to react against the re-
sistance of the established structure in the long run. Second, they benefitted 
from the political involvement of foreign authorities. As became apparent, 
solely economic effects of relocation on needlemakers beyond the territory of 
Aachen and the resulting intervention of foreign authorities finally stabilized 
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the new emerging paradigm. To put it in the words of Weik, the success in 
overcoming regulation and establishing the new practice of relocation was by 
no means a “success in a linear timeline” (2011, 472). Rather, the emergence of 
the new practice was rich in interdependencies between structure and agency. 
This leads to the methodological implication: the article could show that the 
integration of TCM and ASC contributes to overcoming IE’s shortcomings. 
First, the integrated approach helps to widen the focus from how some actors, 
rather than others, become institutional entrepreneurs across to (external) inter-
action of entrepreneurial groups with the established structure. Second, the 
DRSC may contribute to overcoming the reductionist perspective of IE on 
“success in a linear timeline” (Weik 2011, 472) by explaining change process 
as a dynamic-reciprocal process of interdependencies between agency and 
structure. 
Certainly, there remain unanswered questions. The strengths are weaknesses 
as well. On the one hand, the DRSC overcomes the reductionist perspective. 
On the other hand, it does not explain intrapersonal factors of agency such as 
“habit, imagination, and judgment” (Garud et al. 2007, 561) and their impact 
on an actor’s decision to act within the scope of the possibility space or to 
exceed it. For the given case, this methodological deficit is bearable, as there 
are no sources (such as ego-documents) which could help us to learn more 
about the motivation and the individual predisposing of the entrepreneurial 
group. Further applications of the DRSC may aim to improve the model by 
using concepts capturing those intrapersonal perspectives, which the field of IE 
is so rich in. Moreover, it may be relevant to broaden the DRSC by using a 
multi-actor perspective. In this study, I focused only on a particular class of 
actors (merchants) and their reciprocal interrelationship with structure. Re-
member, the possibility space is delineated actor-specifically. Further studies 
could also examine other classes of actors (e.g., domestic craftsmen) and their 
interrelationship with structure. In doing so, one could discuss the actors’ be-
havior both under particular structural circumstances and within an actor-
network. 
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